Articles by Richard Traina
Avulsions Can Greatly Impact Property Ownership Claims
by Richard L. Traina
Those of us in the New Orleans metropolitan area think of the Mississippi River’s course as static, hemmed in by the federal levee system. The River meandering—or somehow changing course—is far from mind. However, one of Louisiana’s other major rivers, the Red River, was not contained by a comprehensive levee system as recently as the middle of the last century. Changes in the Red River’s course 80 years ago still manage to spawn present-day litigation that can be instructive to riparian landowners throughout the state, especially where minerals and mineral rights may be involved.
Hall Ponderosa, LLC v. State of La., through the La. State Land Office
The Haynesville shale formation is a layer of sedimentary rock in northwestern Louisiana, southwestern Arkansas, and eastern Texas. Some of the formation stretches well across the northern central portion of Louisiana. Although producing natural gas from “the Haynesville” once was considered too costly, rising energy costs and newer technology and processes (like fracking) changed that, leading to a rush of activity as energy exploration companies began to lease property in north Louisiana in preparation for possible drilling and production. As a result, the amounts that landowners could get for selling mineral leases rose sharply. One obvious way to cash in was to own a lot of land.
In Hall Ponderosa, LLC v. State of La., through the La. State Land Office, Hall Ponderosa, LLC (“HP”) apparently sought to do just that when it filed suit in 2012 in Red River Parish against the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana State Land Office and through the Louisiana State Mineral and Energy Board, and against several landowners.
HP owned property with title acreage of approximately 48 acres that it acquired in 1926 and 1952. However, HP claimed that its property’s acreage had grown to over 310 acres as a result of changes in the Red River’s path and the deposition of large amounts of alluvion or accretion on HP’s property. HP claimed that its title acreage increased seven-fold through (1) the Red River making an avulsion cut north of HP’s property that caused the Red River to meander away from HP’s property and create a large deposit of alluvion during and after the flood of 1945, and (2) the Red River then slowly migrating south and adding significate alluvion to the southern portion of HP’s property. Hall Ponderosa, LLC v. State of La., through the La. State Land Office, 54,678 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/22), 345 So. 3d 537, writ denied, 2022-01550 (La. 1/11/23).[1]
Key to HP’s claims was that its property was riparian to the Red River and that only one avulsion occurred during the 1945 flood. If so, the land at issue was accretion (or alluvion) that belonged to HP.[2]
Court Rulings
Following a bench trial held from February 20 through March 3, 2018, the trial court ruled against HP on the property dispute. The trial court found that the Red River abandoned its bed in the 1945 flood as a result of two avulsions. Therefore, the property that HP acquired in 1926 lost its riparian status and no further growth through accretion could have occurred. The trial court also agreed with the State’s position that the 1952 property had not been riparian since 1945; thus, it could not have increased by accretion.
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the decision and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied HP’s request to consider the case.
The central issue in the case was the movement of the Red River in 1945 and whether one or two avulsions occurred. The Louisiana Civil Code does not define avulsion. However, according to the Romanist tradition, avulsion is a violent action of the water of a river that detaches an identifiable part of riparian land and attaches it to other lands on the same or the opposite bank. An avulsion also has been defined as an “overnight cataclysmic change in the river course resulting in remnant water and more particularly a change in course.” When “a navigable river or stream abandons its bed and opens a new one, the owners of the land on which the new bed is located shall take by way of indemnification the abandoned bed, each in proportion to the quantity of land that he lost.” La. Civ. Code art. 504.
Expert Testimony Was Key
Resolution of the property issue turned on expert testimony. The trial court found the State’s expert, Dr. Frank Willis, more persuasive because of his superior credentials and ability to articulate and explain the complex river movement at issue. The appellate court found that the trial court did not commit manifest error and it was not clearly wrong in accepting Dr. Willis’s testimony.
Dr. Willis testified that two avulsions occurred; he marked the first one in blue and the second in red on one of the State’s trial exhibits:
Dr. Willis testified that prior to 1945, the Red River made a hairpin bend, which was probably as tight as it could have turned considering the soil in the area. He stated that during the flood of 1945, the river jumped its left descending bank, made an avulsive cut across the peninsula, and “roared” across the peninsula created by the hairpin turn in a new riverbed. He testified that because of the momentum going through the first new cut, the river would not have been able to turn after the first avulsion and stay in its existing bank.
Dr. Willis testified that if the second avulsion had not occurred (as HP claimed), the river would have had to make a sudden turn to the northeast to remain in the riverbed. He stated that the only way it could have done that is if it hit rock or some other type of formation, but nothing of the sort was there. He therefore concluded that a second avulsion did occur, south of the first avulsion. As a result, HP’s claim to a seven-fold increase in its acreage failed.
The Lesson for Riparian Landowners
The case shows that riparian landowners who could benefit from an increase in their title acreage should consider historic changes to the path of the river or bayou to which their property is (or was) riparian and whether those changes support a claim for increased acreage. Similarly, if a riparian landowner claims to own property that you believe is yours as a result of historic changes in the path of a river or bayou, the nature of the historic changes should be considered in weighing the validity of the claim.
I Can Bike, Run, or Walk on the Path Atop the Mississippi River Levee, Can’t I?
by Richard L. Traina
In the riparian land use case, West Baton Rouge Parish Council v. Tullier, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal ruled on the constitutionality of the statute providing for bicycle paths and walkways atop the Mississippi River levee, deciding that the statute did not expand the permanent levee servitude or create an additional servitude.
Can You Bike, Run, or Walk Atop a Levee Path?
Say that you live near the Mississippi River levee anywhere from Baton Rouge downriver through Plaquemines Parish. Without ever giving it much thought, you often use the paved path atop the levee to bike, run, or walk. One day you head to the path and are greeted by something new—the riparian landowner has blocked the path with vehicles and has erected a gate across the path. Worse, when you make your way around the obstructions the riparian landowner brandishes a handgun and tells you that you have no right to use his property. You wisely turn around and head home to your Peloton.
The blocked path/handgun scenario occurred in April 2017, when a contractor hired by the West Baton Rouge Parish Council attempted to construct a bicycle path and walkway atop the Mississippi River levee in West Baton Rouge Parish. The riparian landowners over whose property the path would run were not happy and took the extreme measures noted above to prevent the construction. Without a shot being fired, litigation ensued.
Louisiana Statute Provides for Bicycle Paths and Walkways Atop the Mississippi River Levee
In West Baton Rouge Parish Council v. Tullier, 2018-1722 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/11/21), 317 So. 3d 782, writ denied, 2021-00389 (La. 5/4/21),[1] the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of the statute providing for bicycle paths and walkways atop the Mississippi River levee, La. R.S. 38:301A(3) and (4). The statute provides:
(3) Along the main line levees of the Mississippi River in Ascension, East Baton Rouge, Iberville, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, and West Baton Rouge parishes, levee boards and levee and drainage boards may construct bicycle paths and walkways along the top of the levees. The legal servitude granted to a levee board and a levee and drainage board pursuant to law shall include the construction of bicycle paths and walkways along the top of levees as provided in this Section.
(4) Levee boards or levee and drainage boards, or the governing authority where a levee district does not exist, may allow the public to utilize for recreational purposes as long as the structural integrity of the levee or flood control structure is not compromised, levees under the jurisdiction of the board, or by the governing authority where a levee district does not exist, and may construct or permit bicycle paths and walkways.
The riparian landowners’ property in Tullier is burdened with a permanent levee servitude in favor of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District. In 1931, the District appropriated the landowners’ property for levee purposes. The landowners asserted that La. R.S. 38:301(A)(3) and (4) was unconstitutional because it sought to expand the permanent levee servitude under which land was appropriated for levees purposes to encompass recreational purposes, resulting in the taking of their property in violation of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal disagreed.
Legal Servitudes and the Limitations on Ownership
The court noted that the “legal servitude” referenced in La. R.S. 38:301(A)(3) is the permanent levee servitude of Civil Code article 665, which burdens all riparian land and permits the “making and repairing of levees, roads, and other public or common works.” The permanent levee servitude is an “ancient servitude” codified in article 665 that has burdened riparian land ever since the land first was separated from the public domain and has been maintained through the transitions of the Civil Code since 1808.
Legal servitudes are limitations on ownership established by law for the benefit of the general public. La. Civ. Code art. 659. The permanent levee servitude burdening the landowners’ property is not only a legal public servitude, but a predial servitude. See La. Civ. Code arts. 646 and 654. The use and extent of servitudes, such as the permanent levee servitude, are regulated by the title by which they are created. See La. Civ. Code art. 697.
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal’s Findings
The legal servitude burdening the riparian landowners’ property was appropriated in 1931 through a resolution of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District. That resolution vested the District with the right to use the lands within its territorial limits “for levee purposes along the Mississippi River.” The First Circuit reasoned that any limitations on the use of the appropriated land by either the owner or the appropriating authority must be expressed, and, in this case, the expression necessarily would have been in the 1931 resolution. The court found that no provision of the resolution limited the District’s use of the appropriated riparian land. Thus, there was no limiting regulation by title.
In the absence of a limiting regulation by title, Civil Code article 665 (the levee servitude article) provides that “[a]ll that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by laws or particular regulations.” La. R.S. 38:301 sets forth the law governing levee servitudes along the Mississippi River in the parishes listed in La. R.S. 38:301A(3) and states that bicycle paths and walkways atop the levee may be constructed in those parishes in accordance with the permanent levee servitude. Because no other provision in the levee servitude articles indicated otherwise, La. R.S. 38:301 governed and permitted West Baton Rouge Parish to construct bicycle paths and walkways along the top of levees and allowed the public to utilize the levee for recreational purposes.
Accordingly, the First Circuit found that La. R.S. 38:301(A)(3) and (4) do not impermissibly expand the permanent levee servitude nor do they create any additional servitude. The statute merely provides that the Civil Code article 665 permanent levee servitude “shall include the construction of bicycle paths and walkways along the top of levees.”
The court also noted that La. R.S. 38:301 is neutral regarding the public’s use of levees for recreational purposes and the construction of bicycle paths or walkways on levees; the statute specifically does not encourage or require such use or construction. See La. R.S. 38:301F. Additionally, La. R.S. 38:301 provides immunity to a riparian landowner from liability for personal injury, property damage, or other loss to individuals occurring while a person enters onto such property for recreational purposes. See La. R.S. 38:301E(1). Also, La. R.S. 38:301 does not restrict a riparian landowner from “the normal, reasonable, and foreseeable use of levee property upon which a bicycle path or walkway is constructed.” La. R.S. 38:301E(2). Finally, riparian landowners can seek compensation for the use of their property as bicycle paths/walkways. La. R.S. 38:301E(3). Taking all those points into account, the court concluded that La. R.S. 38:301A(3) and (4) are constitutional and did not result in a taking of the landowners’ property in violation of the Louisiana or United States Constitutions.
Notably, Tullier was a 2-1 split decision. In dissent, Judge Guidry found that by providing that land appropriated for levees purposes may be used for building bicycle paths and walkways (purely recreational purposes), the legislature improperly expanded the constitutional right of appropriation. Thus, according to Judge Guidry, that unlawful expansion results in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Upshot
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in Tullier. However, the issue could arise again in one of the parishes listed in La. R.S. 38:301A(3) outside of the First Circuit’s jurisdiction. Any such new case might even involve a servitude-appropriating resolution that (unlike the resolution in Tullier) limited the appropriating authority’s use of the appropriated riparian land. As such, users of the bicycle path/walkways atop the Mississippi River levee outside the First Circuit’s jurisdiction might want to keep their Peloton subscriptions current.